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Abstract
In order to improve the eavesdropping detection efficiency in two-step quantum
direct communication protocol, an improved eavesdropping detection strategy using
four-particle GHZ state is proposed, in which four-particle GHZ state is used to
detect eavesdroppers. During the security analysis, the method of the entropy theory
is introduced, and two detection strategies are compared quantitatively by using
the constraint between the information which eavesdropper can obtain and the
interference introduced. If the eavesdroppers intend to obtain all information, the
eavesdropping detection rate of the original two-step quantum direct communication
protocol by using EPR pair block as detection particles is 50%; while the proposed
strategy’s detection rate is 88%. In the end, the security of the proposed protocol
is discussed. The analysis results show that the eavesdropping detection strategy
presented is more secure.
Keywords: quantum direct communication; four-particle GHZ state; eavesdrop-
ping detection; protocol security; dense coding scheme
PACS: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta
1 Introduction
The goal of cryptography is to ensure that the secret message is intelligible
only for the two authorized parties of communication and should not be altered
during the transmission. So far, it is trusted that the only proven secure cryp-
tophyte is the one-time-pad scheme in which the secret key is as long as the
∗ E-mail:jinhaifei@bupt.edu.cn
Preprint submitted to CEJP 15 June 2018
message. The two distant parties who want to transmit their secret message
must distribute the secret key first. But it is difficult to distribute securely the
secret key through a classical channel. The quantum key distribution (QKD),
whose task is to create a secret key between two remote authorized users, is
one of the most remarkable applications of quantum mechanics and the only
proven protocol for secure key distribution. Since Bennet and Brassard pre-
sented the pioneer QKD protocol (BB84 protocol) [1] in 1984, a lot of quantum
information security processing methods have been advanced, such as quan-
tum teleportation [2-7], quantum dense coding [8-9], quantum secret sharing
[10-11] and so on.
In recent years, a novel concept, quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC) was put forward and studied by some groups. Different from key
distribution whose object is to establish a common random key between two
parties, a secure direct communication is to communication important mes-
sage directly without first establishing a random key to encrypt them. Thus
secure direct communication is more demanding on the security. As a secure
direct communication, it must satisfy two requirements. First, the secure mes-
sage should be read out directly by the legitimate user Bob when he receives
the quantum state and no additional classical information is needed after the
transmission of particles. Second, the secret message which has been encoded
already in the quantum states should not leak even though an eavesdropper
may get hold of the channel. That is to say, the eavesdropper cannot only
be detected but also obtains blind results. As classical message can be copied
fully, it is impossible to transmit secret message directly through classical
channels. But when quantum mechanics enters into the communication, the
story will change.
Another class of quantum communication protocols [12-14] used to trans-
mit secret message are called deterministic secure quantum communication
(DSQC). Certainly, the receiver can read out the secret message only after he
ex-changes at least one bit of classical information for each particle with the
sender in a DSQC protocol, which is different from QSDC. DSQC is similar to
QKD, but it can be used to obtain deterministic information, not a random
binary string, which is different from the QKD protocols in which the user
cannot predict whether an instance is useful or not.
Many people are interested in researching QSDC, and many protocols like
QSDC were proposed, including the protocols without using entanglement [15-
17], the protocols using entanglement [18-23] and the two-way QSDC protocols
[24-33].The QSDC protocol can also be used in some special environments as
first proposed by Bostr?m et al. [34] and Deng et al. [18]. In Ref. [34], Bostrom
and Felbinger presented a famous QSDC protocol which is called ”ping-pong”
protocol. But researchers have found much vulnerability in the ”ping-pong”
protocol, such as the ”ping-pong” protocol cannot resist the ”man-in-middle
attack” and the transmission capacity is low.
In order to improve the eavesdropping detection efficiency in two-step quan-
tum direct communication protocol, an improved eavesdropping detection
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strategy using four-particle GHZ state is proposed, in which four-particle GHZ
state is used to detect eavesdroppers. During the security analysis, the method
of the entropy theory is introduced, and two detection strategies are compared
quantitatively by using the constraint between the information which eaves-
dropper can obtain and the interference introduced. If the eavesdroppers in-
tend to obtain all information, the eavesdropping detection rate of the original
two-step quantum direct communication protocol by using EPR pair block as
detection particles is 50%; while the proposed strategy’s detection rate is 88%.
In the end, the security of the proposed protocol is discussed. The analysis
results show that the eavesdropping detection strategy presented is more se-
cure.
For simplicity, suppose that the protocol presented in Ref. [18] is shortened
as DPP and the improved protocol in this paper is shortened as FPP.
2 DPP Protocol
An EPR pair can be in one of the four Bell states,
∣∣∣ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(
∣∣∣01〉− ∣∣∣10〉), (1)
∣∣∣ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(
∣∣∣01〉+ ∣∣∣10〉), (2)
∣∣∣φ−〉 = 1√
2
(
∣∣∣00〉− ∣∣∣11〉), (3)
∣∣∣φ+〉 = 1√
2
(
∣∣∣00〉+ ∣∣∣11〉). (4)
If the state of a single photon be measured, the Bell state will collapse and
the state of the other particle will be completely determined if we know the
measurement result of the first photon. As is known to all, the basic principle
of the original ”ping-pong” protocol is that one bit information can be en-
coded in the states
∣∣∣ψ±〉, which is completely unavailable to anyone who has
access to either of the particles. To extract secret message from Alice, Bob
must own both particles, for no experiment performed on only one particle
can distinguish these states from each other [34].
Let us start with a brief description of the DPP protocol.
(S1) Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pairs in state
∣∣∣ψ−〉 , extracts all the
first particles, and forming the sequence S1 in order. The remainder particles
are formed the sequence S2 in order.
(S2) Alice sends the sequence S1 to Bob. Alice and Bob then check eavesdrop-
ping by the following procedure:(a) Bob chooses randomly a number of the
photons from the sequence S1 and tells Alice which particles he has chosen.
(b) Bob chooses randomly one of the two sets of MBs, say, σZ and σX to
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measure the chosen photons. (c) Bob tells Alice which MB he has chosen for
each photon and the outcomes of his measurements. (d) Alice uses the same
MB as Bob to measure the corresponding photons in the sequence S2 and
checks with the results of Bob. If no eavesdropper exists, their results should
be completely opposite. This is the first eavesdropping check. After that, if the
error rate is small, Alice and Bob can conclude that there is no eavesdropper
in the line. Alice and Bob continue to perform step(S3); otherwise, they have
to discard their transmission and abort the communication.
(S3) Alice encodes her messages on the sequence S2 and transmits it to Bob.
Before the transmission, Alice must encode the EPR pairs. In order to guard
for eavesdropping in this transmission, Alice has to add a small trick in the
sequence S2. She selects randomly in the sequence S2 some particles and per-
forms on them randomly one of the four operations. The number of such
particles is not big as long as it can provide an analysis of the error rate. Only
Alice knows the positions of these sampling particles and keeps them secret
until the communication is completed. The remaining sequence S2 particles
are used to carry the secret message directly. To encode the message, they use
the dense coding scheme of Bennett and Wiesner [8], where the information
is encoded on an EPR pair with a local operation on a single qubit. Here, the
dense coding idea was generalized into secure direct communication. Different
from dense coding, in this protocol, both the particles in an EPR pair are sent
from Alice to Bob in two steps, and the transmission of EPR pairs is done
in block. Explicitly, Alice makes one of the four unitary operations (U0,U1,U2
and U3) to each of her particles,
U0 = I =
∣∣∣0〉〈0∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣1〉〈1∣∣∣, (5)
U1 = σz =
∣∣∣0〉〈0∣∣∣− ∣∣∣1〉〈1∣∣∣, (6)
U2 = σx =
∣∣∣1〉〈0∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣0〉〈1∣∣∣, (7)
U3 = −iσy =
∣∣∣1〉〈0∣∣∣− ∣∣∣0〉〈1∣∣∣. (8)
And they transform the state
∣∣∣ψ−〉 into ∣∣∣ψ−〉, ∣∣∣ψ+〉 , ∣∣∣φ−〉 and ∣∣∣φ+〉, respec-
tively. These operations correspond to 00, 01, 10 and 11, respectively.
(S4) After the transmission of sequence S2, Alice tells Bob the positions of
the sampling pairs and the type of the unitary operations on them. Bob per-
forms Bell-basis measurement on the sequence S1 and S2 simultaneously. By
checking the sampling pairs that Alice has chosen, he will get an estimate of
the error rate in the sequence S2 transmission. In fact, in the second transmis-
sion, Eve can only disturb the transmission and cannot steal the information
because she can only get one particle from an EPR pair.
(S5) If the error rate of the sampling pairs is reasonably low, Alice and Bob
can then entrust the process, and continue to correct the error in the secret
message using error correction methods. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abandon
the transmission and repeat the procedure from the beginning.
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(S6) Alice and Bob do error correction on their results. This procedure is
exactly the same as that in QKD. However, to preserve the integrity of the
message, the bits preserving correction code, such as CASCADE [35], should
be used.
3 FPP Protocol
3.1 The process of the FPP protocol
In the protocol presented in Ref.[36], the transmission is managed in batches
of N EPR pairs. An advantage of block transmission scheme is that we can
check the security of the transmission by measuring some of the decoy photons
[37-38] in the first step, where both Alice and Bob contain a particle sequence
at hand, which means that an eavesdropper has no access to the first particle
sequence, then no information will be leaked to her whatever she has done to
the second particle sequence. Following this method using block transmission,
the FPP scheme is proposed, shown in Fig.1.
Fig. 1. The process of the FPP
Define ∣∣∣ψ〉 = 1√
2
(
∣∣∣0000〉+ ∣∣∣1111〉). (9)
Now let us give an explicit process for the FPP.
(S1) Bob prepares a large enough number (N ) of Bell states
∣∣∣φ+〉 in order. He
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extracts all the first particles in these Bell state, forming the sequence A (the
travel qubits) in order, used to transmit secure message, and the remaining
particles forming the sequence B (the home qubits) in order.
(S2) Bob prepares a large number (cN/(1-c)) of four-particle GHZ states
∣∣∣ψ〉
and forms the sequence C to detect eavesdropping. Here, c expresses the prob-
ability of switching to the control mode in the original ”ping-pong” protocol
[34].Note that the sequence C includes 4cN/(1-c) particles. In the sequence
C, Bob reserves the particle 1 of the four-particle GHZ state, and measures
them by Z-basis BZ = {
∣∣∣0〉, ∣∣∣1〉}.After that, Bob inserts particles 2, 3, 4 of the
four-particle GHZ state to the sequence A randomly, forming a new sequence
D, which includes decoy photons of four-particle GHZ state, but only Bob
knows the position of decoy photons.
(S3) Bob stores the sequence B and sends the sequence D to Alice.
(S4) After Alice received the sequence D, Bob tells her the positions where are
the decoy photons and the measurement of particles 1 of four-particle GHZ
state in C. Then, Alice extracts the decoy photons from the sequence D and
performs measurement. This is the first eavesdropping check.If there is no
eavesdropper, when Bob’s measurement is
∣∣∣0〉,then the measurement result of
particles 2, 3, 4 should be
∣∣∣000〉;while Bob’s measurement is ∣∣∣1〉, particles 2,
3, 4 should be
∣∣∣111〉 , and they continue to the next step(S5), the FPP pro-
tocol keeping on. Otherwise, the communication is interrupted, and the FPP
protocol switches to (S1).
(S5) Alice discards the decoy photons, then the sequence D becomes to the
sequence A again. Alice encodes her messages on the sequence A and trans-
mits it to Bob. In order to guard for eavesdropping in this transmission, Alice
also has to insert some four-particle GHZ state particles in the sequence A
before the transmission. Alice only inserts particles 2, 3, 4 of the four-particle
GHZ state in the sequence A and reserves the particle 1. Only Alice knows the
positions of these decoy photons and the measurement results of the particles
1, and keeps them until the communication is completed. The sequence A are
used to carry the secret message directly. To increase the transmission capac-
ity, the dense coding scheme be used to encode the secret message. Different
from dense coding, in this protocol, the transmission of EPR pairs is done
in block. Explicitly, Alice makes one of the four unitary operations (U0,U1,U2
and U3) to each of her particles, and they transform the state
∣∣∣φ+〉 into ∣∣∣φ+〉,∣∣∣φ−〉 , ∣∣∣ψ+〉 and ∣∣∣ψ−〉, respectively. These operations correspond to 00, 01, 10
and 11, respectively. Then Alice transmits the sequence A which carries decoy
photons to Bob.
(S6) After transmitting the sequence A, Alice tells Bob the positions of the
decoy photons and the measurement results of the particles 1. To obtain the
secret message, Bob performs Bell-basis measurement on the sequences A and
B simultaneously. By checking the decoy photons that Alice insert, Bob will
get an estimate of the error rate in the sequence A transmission. In fact, Eve
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can only disturb the transmission and cannot steal the information because
she can only get one particle from an EPR pair. If the error rate of the decoy
photons is reasonably low, Alice and Bob can then entrust the process, and
continue to transmit the secret message. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abandon
the transmission and repeat the procedures from the beginning.
As discussed above, the secret message can be transmitted securely be-
tween Alice and Bob, and the eavesdropper will be found out if she disturbs
the quantum line. Eve cannot read out the information from the EPR pairs
even if she captures the sequence A, because no one can read the information
from one particle of the EPR pair alone. So, the improved protocol is secure.
3.2 The security analysis of the protocol
In the original ”ping-pong” protocol, the author calculated the maximal amount
of the information I(dlO) that Eve can eavesdrop and the probability dlO that
Eve is detected [34]. And the function I(dlO) is provided. When p0 = p1 = 0.5,
I(dlO) = −dlOlog2dlO − (1− dlO)log2(1− dlO). (10)
The above method can be used to compare the efficiency of eavesdropping
detection between the two protocols.
Now, let us analyze the efficiency of eavesdropping detection in FPP proto-
col. In order to gain the information that Alice operates on the travel qubits,
Eve performs the unitary attack operation E on the composed system firstly.
Then Alice takes a coding operation on the travel qubits. Eve performs a mea-
surement on the composed system at last. Note that, all transmitted particles
are sent as block before detecting eavesdropping, which is different from the
original ”ping-pong” protocol. For Eve does not know which particles are used
to detect eavesdropping, so what she can do is only performing the same at-
tack operation on all the particles. As for Eve, the state of the travel qubits is
indistinguishable from the complete mixture, so all the travel qubits are con-
sidered in either of the states
∣∣∣0〉 or ∣∣∣1〉 with equal probability p = 0.5.
Generally speaking, suppose there is a group of decoy photons at the four-
particle GHZ state
∣∣∣ψ〉, and after performed the attack operation E, the states∣∣∣0〉 and ∣∣∣1〉 become
∣∣∣ϕ′0〉 = E ⊗ ∣∣∣0x〉 = α∣∣∣0x0〉+ β∣∣∣1x1〉, (11)∣∣∣ϕ′1〉 = E ⊗ ∣∣∣1x〉 = m∣∣∣0y0〉+ n∣∣∣1y1〉, (12)
where
∣∣∣xi〉 and ∣∣∣yi〉 are the pure ancillary states determined by the operation
E uniquely, and
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1, |m|2 + |n|2 = 1. (13)
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Then let us calculate the detection probability. Attacked by Eve, the state
of composed system becomes
∣∣∣ψ〉
Eve
= I ⊗E ⊗ E ⊗ E
[ 1√
2
(∣∣∣0x0x0x0x〉 + ∣∣∣1x1x1x1x〉)]
=
1√
2
[∣∣∣0〉⊗ (α∣∣∣0x0〉+ β∣∣∣1x1〉)⊗ (α∣∣∣0x0〉+ β∣∣∣1x1〉)⊗ (α∣∣∣0x0〉+ β∣∣∣1x1〉)
+
∣∣∣1〉⊗ (m∣∣∣0y0〉+ n∣∣∣1y1〉)⊗ (m∣∣∣0y0〉+ n∣∣∣1y1〉)⊗ (m∣∣∣0y0〉+ n∣∣∣1y1〉)]
=
1√
2
[∣∣∣0〉⊗(α3∣∣∣0x00x00x0〉+α2β∣∣∣0x00x01x1〉+α2β∣∣∣0x01x10x0〉+αβ2∣∣∣0x01x11x1〉
+α2β
∣∣∣1x10x00x0〉+ αβ2∣∣∣1x10x01x1〉+ αβ2∣∣∣1x11x10x0〉+ β3∣∣∣1x11x11x1〉)
+
∣∣∣1〉⊗(m3∣∣∣0y00y00y0〉+m2n∣∣∣0y00y01y1〉+m2n∣∣∣0y01y10y0〉+mn2∣∣∣0y01y11y1〉
+m2n
∣∣∣1y10y00y0〉+mn2∣∣∣1y10y01y1〉+mn2∣∣∣1y11y10y0〉+n3∣∣∣1y11y11y1〉)]. (14)
Obviously, when Alice performs measurement on the decoy photons, the
probability without eavesdropper is
p
(∣∣∣ψ〉
Eve
)
=
1
2
(
|α3|2 + |n3|2
)
. (15)
So the lower bound of the detection probability is
dlF = 1− p
(∣∣∣ψ〉
Eve
)
= 1− 1
2
(
|α3|2 + |n3|2
)
. (16)
Suppose |α|2 = a, |β|2 = b, |m|2 = s, |n|2 = t, where a, b, s and t are positive
real numbers, and a+ b = s+ t = 1. Then
dlF = 1− 1
2
(
a3 + t3
)
. (17)
However, in DPP, authors calculated the efficiency of eavesdropping detec-
tion, here don’t analyze it again, and the efficiency is
dlD = |β|2 = |β ′|2 = 1− |α|2 = 1− |α′|2. (18)
Now, let us analyze how much information Eve can gain maximally when
there is no control mode. Similar to that in Ref. [18], first, let us suppose
that the quantum state of the photon in the hand of Alice is
∣∣∣0〉, Alice takes
measurement on the photon in her hand with single-photon detector and the
state is
∣∣∣0〉. Then the state of the system composed of Bob’s photon is
∣∣∣ψ′〉 = E∣∣∣0, E〉 ≡ E∣∣∣0〉∣∣∣E〉 = α∣∣∣0〉∣∣∣ε00〉+ β∣∣∣1〉∣∣∣ε01〉 ≡ α∣∣∣0, ε00〉+ β∣∣∣1, ε01〉,
(19)
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and Eve’s probe can be described by
ρ′ = |α|2
∣∣∣0, ε00〉〈0, ε00∣∣∣+|β|2∣∣∣1, ε01〉〈1, ε01∣∣∣+αβ∗∣∣∣0, ε00〉〈1, ε01∣∣∣+α∗β∣∣∣1, ε01〉〈0, ε00∣∣∣.
(20)
After encoding of the unitary operations U0,U1,U2 and U3 with the probabili-
ties p0, p1, p2 and p3, respectively, the state reads
ρ′′ = (p0 + p3)|α|2
∣∣∣0, ε00〉〈0, ε00∣∣∣+ (p0 + p3)|β|2∣∣∣1, ε01〉〈1, ε01∣∣∣
+(p0 − p3)αβ∗
∣∣∣0, ε00〉〈1, ε01∣∣∣+ (p0 − p3)α∗β|1, ε01〉〈0, ε00∣∣∣
+(p1 + p2)|α|2
∣∣∣1, ε00〉〈1, ε00∣∣∣+ (p1 + p2)|β|2∣∣∣0, ε01〉〈0, ε01∣∣∣
+ (p1 − p2)αβ∗
∣∣∣1, ε00〉〈0, ε01∣∣∣+ (p1 − p2)α∗β∣∣∣0, ε01〉〈1, ε00∣∣∣, (21)
which can be rewritten in the orthogonal basis {
∣∣∣0, ε00〉, ∣∣∣1, ε01〉, ∣∣∣1, ε00〉, ∣∣∣0, ε01〉},
ρ′′ =


(p0 + p3)|α|2 (p0 − p3)αβ∗ 0 0
(p0 − p3)α∗β (p0 + p3)|β|2 0 0
0 0 (p1 + p2)|α|2 (p1 − p2)αβ∗
0 0 (p1 − p2)α∗β (p1 + p2)|β|2


, (22)
with
p0 + p1 + p2 + p3 = 1. (23)
The information I0 that Eve can get is equal to the Von Neumann entropy
I0 =
3∑
i=0
−λi log2 λi. (24)
Where λi(i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ) are the eigenvalues of ρ
′′, which are
λ0,1 =
1
2
(p0 + p3)± 1
2
√
(p0 + p3)2 − 16p0p3|α|2|β|2
=
1
2
(p0 + p3)± 1
2
√
(p0 + p3)2 − 16p0p3(d− d2) (25)
λ2,3 =
1
2
(p1 + p2)± 1
2
√
(p1 + p2)2 − 16p1p2|α|2|β|2
=
1
2
(p1 + p2)± 1
2
√
(p1 + p2)2 − 16p1p2(d− d2) (26)
In the case of p0 = p1 = p2 = p3 = 0.25, where Alice encodes exactly 2
bits, expression(25-26) simplify to λ0 = 0.5d, λ1 = 0.5(1 − d), λ2 = 0.5d and
λ3 = 0.5(1 − d). Interestingly, the maximal information gain is equal to the
Shannon entropy of a binary channel
I0(d) = −1
2
d log2(
1
2
d)− (1
2
− 1
2
d) log2(
1
2
− 1
2
d)
9
− 1
2
d log2(
1
2
d)− (1
2
− 1
2
d) log2(
1
2
− 1
2
d). (27)
Then assume that Bob sends
∣∣∣1〉 rather than ∣∣∣0〉. The above security anal-
ysis can be done in full analogy, resulting in the same crucial relations. The
maximal amount of information is equal to the Shannon entropy of a binary
channel
I1(d) = −1
2
d log2(
1
2
d)− (1
2
− 1
2
d) log2(
1
2
− 1
2
d)
− 1
2
d log2(
1
2
d)− (1
2
− 1
2
d) log2(
1
2
− 1
2
d). (28)
So the maximal amount of information that Eve can obtain is
I =
1
2
(I0 + I1) = 1− d log2 d− (1− d) log2(1− d). (29)
After some simple mathematical calculations in FPP, when a = t, get
dlF = 1− a3, (30)
and the maximum I is
I(dlF ) = 1 +H(
3
√
1− dlF ), (31)
where
H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x). (32)
However, in DPP, the maximum I is
I(dlD) = 1− dlD log2 dlD − (1− dlD) log2(1− dlD) = 1 +H(dlD). (33)
The above analysis shows that function I(dlD) and I(dlF ) have the similar
algebraic properties. If Eve wants to gain the full information (I = 2), the
probabilities of eavesdropping detection are dlD(I = 2) = 0.5 in DPP and
dlF (I = 2) = 0.88 in FPP.
In order to contrast the two functions, Fig.2 is given. As are shown in Fig.2,
if Eve wants to gain the full information, she must face a larger detection
probability in FPP than DPP. This also indicates that FPP is more secure
than DPP.
Taking into account the probability c of the decoy mode, the effective trans-
mission rate, i.e. the number of message bits per protocol run, is 1-c, which is
equal to the probability for a message transfer. So, if Eve wants to eavesdrop
one message transfer without being detected, the probability for this event is
s(c, d) = (1− c)+ c(1−d)(1− c)+ c2(1−d)2(1− c)+ ... = 1− c
1− c(1− d) . (34)
Then the probability of successful eavesdropping I = nI(d) bits is s(I, c, d) =
s(c, d)I/I(d). So
s(I, c, d) =
(
1− c
1− c(1− d)
)I/I(d)
, (35)
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where
I(d) = 1 +H( 3
√
1− d). (36)
Fig. 2. The comparison of the two detection results. The dotted line expresses the
function I(dlD) in DPP and the thick line expresses the function I(dlF ) in FPP.
Obviously, if Eve wants to get the full information, she must encounter the higher
detection efficiency in FPP
Now let us analyze the security of the FPP. In the limit I →∞ (a message
or key of infinite length) get s → 0, so the presented protocol in this paper
is asymptotically secure. If the security of the quantum channel is ensured,
the protocol is completely secure. For example, a choice of the decoy mode is
c = 0.5. In Fig.3, the eavesdropping success probability as a function of the
information gain I is plotted, for c = 0.5 and for different detection proba-
bilities d which Eve can choose. Note that for d < 0.5, Eve only gets part of
the message right and does not even know which part. So, the FPP protocol
is proved secure.
Fig. 3. Eavesdropping success probability as a function of the maximal eavesdropped
information, plotted for different detection probabilities d.
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4 Conclusion and Further Work
In summary, an improved eavesdropping detection strategy based on quantum
direct communication protocol based on four-particle GHZ state has been in-
troduced, and two eavesdropping detection strategies are compared quanti-
tatively by using the constraint between the information that eavesdropper
obtains and the interference introduced. In FPP, the sequence B is always in
hands of Bob and Eve can only touch the sequence A, and any useful message
will not be leaked to the potential eavesdropper. So the security message can
be securely transmitted to the receiver. Compared with the DPP, in the FPP
protocol, the four-particle GHZ state particles are used to detect eavesdrop-
ping which increases the efficiency of detection eavesdropping.
In the analysis, if the eavesdropper obtains the full information, she must
face a larger detection probability in the FPP than DPP, which shows that
the efficiency of eavesdropping detection in FPP is higher than DPP, so it can
ensure the quantum direct communication protocol more secure. In order to
detect eavesdropping, Bob sends more decoy photons than DPP, while this
method reduces the number of measurement. That is, Bob gains the better
security at the cost of sending more particles.
As we know, the quantum direct communication protocol can also be used
as an efficient QKD protocol. In this paper, only the situation that the im-
proved protocol is used as a QKD strategy is considered. So the weaknesses
which the quantum direct communication protocol must be faced, such as the
noise channel [39-40], the Dos attack [41-42] and so on, may not be considered.
In the further work, the other QSDC protocol will be researched.
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